UMKC LA W REVIEW development expenses are roughly the same as manufacturing costs. 4 Furthermore, drug discovery and computing seemed to be converging. By the late 1990s, pharmaceutical experts were predicting a new era of rational drug design in which the next generation of pharmaceuticals would be discovered by scientists staring at computer monitors. On the other hand, open source advocates famously argued that having large numbers of volunteers -"many eyeballs" -look at software was a great way to find bugs. 5 Why not use the same methods to find subtle flaws in the genome? Indeed, the scenario even had a villain: "Big Pharma" with its massively hierarchical teams looked perfect for the part of Microsoft. Finally, biologists were already launching initiatives (most notably the SNP Consortium and the Bermuda Protocol) that renounced patent rights in the human genome. 6 By 2000, many observers thought that open source drug discovery collaborations were just around the comer. 7 Nearly a decade later, the revolution has yet to arrive. Some commentators still see a future in which hackers trade open source molecules 8 and even entire life forms. 9 Increasingly, however, it is the absence of open source drug discovery that needs explaining. Why has so little happened? Most scholars 4 Phil Norris, Virtual Pharma: Re-examining the Impact on Business Performance, Pharm. Tech. Europe (2003) (estimating that per-drug manufacturing and supply costs total twenty-two percent while research and development costs total twenty percent. Since open source researchers cannot charge patients, they are unable to repay these expenses." Second, drug patents are notoriously lucrative. Given that so many biologist-entrepreneurs have become millionaires, why should anyone donate their ideas to an open source collaboration? These are serious hurdles to collaboration. At some level, however, the arguments prove too much: Software, after all, is also expensive to make and frequently lucrative. Yet these facts have not stopped open source from colonizing and even dominating many products. Software creation is big enough to include both open source and proprietary projects. Might not similar niches exist in the complex world of drug discovery? As we shall see, closer examination reveals many locations along the drug discovery pipeline where patent-driven research and development is indeed compatible with -and may even support -open source methods.
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This article reviews the first tentative experiments with open source drug discovery and identifies spaces within the drug discovery pipeline where more convincing examples of open source collaboration could take root. Section II discusses the sometimes elusive definition of "open source drug discovery" and distinguishes the term from "open science" and related concepts. Section III examines recent biology collaborations that are sometimes said to resemble open source. Section IV argues that more convincing collaborations can be designed by scrutinizing the drug discovery pipeline for subtasks that match the known strengths and weaknesses of open source methods. Section V describes three relatively modest examples of open source collaborations that could plausibly be built in the next few years. Section VI discusses more ambitious, longer-term ideas for using open source methods to cut costs at the very expensive downstream end of the drug discovery pipeline. Section VII asks whether open source drug discovery needs so-called "viral" or "copyleft" licenses that prevent users from patenting improvements and, if so, whether such agreements are legal. Finally, Section VIII presents a brief conclusion.
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II. WHAT DOES OPEN SOURCE DRUG DISCOVERY MEAN?
As Professor David Opderbeck shrewdly remarked, " [e] xactly what 'open source' means is a subject of some confusion and debate." 'I Strictly speaking, the phrase "open source" is limited to source code, i.e., one particularly transparent and human-readable format for recording computer code.
14 To this extent, phrases like "open source biology" and "open source drug discovery" are oxymorons. That should not, of course, stop us from using them. "Words," as Humpty Dumpty in Alice in Wonderland observed, "mean what I choose them to mean." 5 But we should at least reserve the label for something new. As we will see in Section III, biology collaborations often use the word "open" to describe the absence of patents. Patent-less research, however, is hardly novel. After all, scientists were already doing research for such non-monetary reasons as reputation and curiosity in Linnaeus' time. 1 6 If there is something new in "open source" production, then, it must be more than the traditional practices that some observers call "open science. That extra something is focus, i.e., the desire to obtain not just knowledge but a specific product. Far more than in traditional science, it is this purposefulness that forces members to interact, to subordinate themselves to a larger plan, and to judge success by such suspiciously capitalist measures as consumer acceptance and market share. Properly understood, then, "open source" is less a legal category than a behavior.
Practically all biology collaborations receive government or foundation funding 8 and it is easy for such groups to add open source licenses to work that they would do anyway. In this case, the actual research activity -for example, how tasks are done and who participates -hardly As open source has begun to attract broad public attention over the last few years, the term itself has been overused as a metaphor."). 14 The opposite of "source code" is "machine language." Modem software is universally written (and modified) at the "source code" level. Special programs called "compilers" are then used to turn it into the efficient machine language versions that computers understand. Human programmers find it virtually impossible to understand or modify programs written in machine language. Most companies distribute compiled code to the public but keep source code versions inhouse. This provides an added level of "self-help" protection over and above formal copyright sanctions. This definition is not entirely satisfactory, since subpart (c) describes incentives negatively (i.e., not price, not hierarchical) instead of using an explicit list. This flaw is understandable for a new subject that is still being explored. More importantly, things are not as bad as they seem; as the next Section points out, social scientists have identified roughly a half dozen incentives that seem to drive all existing open source software projects. In this article, we will normally assume that viable open source drug discovery collaborations must choose from this same, relatively short list of incentives.
In what follows, we ask whether collaborations that fit this description are a feasible way to do drug discovery and if so, whether they would make society better off. We begin by surveying recent attempts to import at least some open source features into biology.
III. FIRST STEPS
The open source label is so appealing that it was only a matter of time until biology collaborations started to use it. These collaborations can usefully be grouped into five categories. The first three -software, community-wide big science projects, and databases -are fairly traditional, grant-supported activities. Because they are hierarchically organized and are not focused on producing The question remains which license to choose. For non-biology software, open source software licenses are often -though not always -selected as a kind of marketing ploy to attract ideologically-motivated volunteers.
However, biology software projects are almost always publicly funded, 36 which leaves little or no need to attract volunteers. In this case, one might think that "he who pays the piper should call the tune," i.e., that funding agencies should specify a single best license for all collaborations. Predictably, funding agencies have been reluctant to grasp this nettle. 37 The problem is that the alternative -letting individual collaborations choose -is surely misguided. At the end of the day, scientists have neither the time nor the training to choose between licenses. Furthermore, different collaborations are bound to pick inconsistent licenses. This can only complicate the legal hurdles facing follow-on projects that seek to compare and combine earlier work. Foundations would be wiser to study the problem in detail and draft uniform terms for grantees to use. Section VI will comment further on what this analysis should be.
Because bioinformatics programs are used to discover drugs, there is a definitional sense in which they must also qualify as "open source drug discovery." At the same time, the fact that biology software -like all programscan be produced using open source methods is hardly surprising. Clearly, it would be much more interesting if non-software projects could be organized using open source methods.
Big Science Projects.
A second set of examples consists of large hierarchical team projects designed to acquire key data for an entire community. One of the earliest and most prominent examples was the SNP Consortium." Here, Britain's Wellcome Trust Foundation and thirteen private sector firms paid scientists to discover genome data and place them in the public domain. 39 Professor Dan Burk has argued that the SNP Consortium's decision to put its discoveries in the public domain shares many features with open source. 4°H owever, it also made good business sense for corporate donors that wanted to block a commercial rival, Celera, from becoming "the Bill Gates of the human participate "for business reasons" or because they want to publish papers. Dugan, supra note 21, at 6. 37 The agencies' reticence may stem from a reluctance to endorse licenses that clash too openly with Congress' pro-commercial 
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UMKC LA W REVIEW genome. ' 41 Instead of making us cynical about open source drug discovery, the observation should give us hope. This is, after all, a case where commercial firms spent money that they had earned from patents to promote openness.
The SNP Consortium's legacy is also visible in the Alliance for Cell Signaling ("AfCS"), a government-funded consortium of nine academic laboratories working together to map the chemical inputs and outputs that control cell behavior. 4 2 AfCS members are allowed to keep data confidential to preserve publication priority. However, this embargo is temporary. Indeed, members are required to place all data in the public domain as soon as their "main findings" are accepted for publication. 43 Furthermore, members must also post afteracquired data "deemed relevant" to the paper's conclusions. 44 Once posted, "all data may be used by any party for research and/or commercial purposes. 45 Finally, AfCS members also waive patents for any discovery that results directly from Alliance funds or reagents. The stated purpose of this clause is to enhance openness between members and eliminate administrative delays related to intellectual property protection. The clause is also said to "facilitate the rapid placement of research discoveries in the public domain," presumably by removing the temptation to delay publication in order to gain a head start on commercialization.'4 Finally, the SNP Consortium's public domain model has received a copyleft twist from the HapMap Consortium's $130 million project to compare multiple human genomes to find disease-causing variations.
For the first two years of HapMap's existence, users could only download data if they agreed to a "clickwrap" license promising not to file "composition of matter" patent claims for any SNP, genotype, or haplotype data based at least partly on HapMap data.
48
Although modeled on the GNU copyleft license, the HapMap license actually focused on a much narrower problem. If the group waited to distribute data until all sequencing was finished, it could deposit a complete list of variations in the 41 Maurer, supra note 6, at 55-56. Merck single-handedly funded a similar academic effort to put "Expressed Sequence Tags" in the public domain because it feared "upstart genomics companies.. . cornering all the rights to valuable genome information." Hope, supra note 7, at 156 (quoting Roger Brent). 42 48 Rai, supra note 18, at 142-43. HapMap's "Data Access Policy for the International HapMap Project" is no longer posted on the Internet. However, the relevant language can be found in Gonzalez, supra note 13, at 350.
[Vol. 76:2 OPEN SOURCE DRUG DISCO VERY public domain. But if it did not wait and published its data piecemeal, outside researchers could compare it against their own sequences to find and patent variations that the Consortium would eventually discover anyhow. The solution was not perfect -HapMap's copyleft feature reportedly kept several public genome databases from using its data 4 9 -but it did let members publish data immediately without an AfCS-style embargo; 5 0 Furthermore, HapMap promised from the outset that it would waive its restrictions as more data accumulated. 51 .
----,,52
This was originally supposed to happen "around the end of calendar 2005.
HapMap lifted its restrictions in late 2004. 53 For now, the future of HapMapstyle clickwrap restrictions is unclear. Because many journals refuse to print articles based on restricted data, future collaborations may prefer systems based on SNP Consortium-style deposits to the public domain or AfCS-style embargos. However, the jury is still out.4
Because these projects are grant-supported and hierarchical, they fail to satisfy Professor Benkler's requirement that genuine open source collaborations rely neither on market signals nor commands. Furthermore, they are essentially indiscriminate in their search for knowledge and, to that extent, lack open source's focus on producing particular economic products. However, these distinctions could turn out to be details. Conceivably, their descendants may yet evolve into directions that fit Professor Benkler's definition. 
Databases
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Recent experiments have centered on finding ways for members to pool their knowledge of gene function. The most technology-intensive initiative is the Distributed Annotation System. 5 8 It automatically combines data from independent databases provided that the authors follow certain minimal computing conventions. 5 Other automated tools (e.g., BioCorba 60 and the Piper Project 61 ) are designed to make peer-to-peer work flow more efficiently across geographically dispersed networks.
Finally, a few proposals eschew technological solutions in favor of better social organization. Because they harvest human judgent, such low technology solutions often produce very powerful databases. 2 One gene annotation wiki ("Wiki for Professionals") is already in place.
63 Interestingly, the experiment has received approximately $2 million in private funding. 64 Backers hope to host private versions of the system that let customers add their own proprietary data to the publicly-available pages. 6 5 If successful, such tools could be readily adapted to many of the open source models discussed in Section V.
Software apart, biology databases are probably the closest analogs to genuine open source drug discovery. Once again, the principal objection is that they do not focus on a specific product. However, physical science databases have long predicted the results of future experiments and it is natural to think that biology databases will one day emulate them by predicting drugs. 66 For this reason, it is reasonable to see current database collaborations as a possible stepping stone to open source drug discovery.
Cambia. Probably the best-known project with open source ambitions is a
Rockefeller-funded collaboration called Cambia. 67 Its Biological Innovation for Open Society ("BiOS") initiative covers a wide assortment of activities, many of which envisage traditional grant-supported work within Cambia itself -for example, inventing new ways to manipulate genomes, extending Cambia's database of life sciences patents, and various leadership and advocacy The main components of this effort so far are two draft "BiOS-compliant" Technology licenses, 70 a "BiOS-Compliant Materials Transfer Agreement" in both "Detailed" and "Simple" versions, and an "initial prototype" web site called Bioforge 71 where members can work together on projects "seeded" by Cambia-developed technologies or else recommend new projects of their own.
7 It would be nice to know whether outside volunteers have actually used Bioforge to do research. For now, the answer seems to be no.
73
Unless and until Bioforge starts functioning, Cambia's licensing scheme is purely theoretical. Nevertheless, the drafters have made some interesting choices. Probably the most striking is Cambia's attempt to bring every improvement that would otherwise give rise to a blocking patent within a "protected commons" where every member could use it. 74 Although Cambia argues that proprietary firms would otherwise "capture" its technology, the argument is far from self-evident. First, one would normally assume that placing technology in the public domain is already enough to protect it from "capture." EcON. 197, 197-232 (2002 
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In the software world, this answer is not always sufficient because code needs to be maintained and will wither away if it is not used. 75 This objection has much less force for biological inventions, however, whose functionality is permanently encoded into the living world. A second, more sophisticated argument echoes the HapMap rationale: At least in principle, companies could monitor the collaboration's work and then rush in to patent trivial improvements that would have been discovered in any case. 76 However, in this case the HapMap solution -a temporary embargo -ought to be sufficient. Finally, a third and more radical argument assumes that most (though presumably not all) inventors who apply for patents would still make and publish discoveries if intellectual property incentives did not exist. In this case, restrictions on patenting could significantly increase the fraction of public domain inventions while only slightly reducing the 77 total volume of innovation. We return to this tradeoff in Section VI below. For now, we remark only that many open source software collaborations let members make proprietary improvements 78 and that Cambia's decision to write viral terms makes its licenses very complex. 9 Finally, there is a real question whether Cambia's vision should be called "open source" at all. Contractually, the scheme is more or less identical to a commercial patent pool in which licensees receive the non-exclusive right to use a patented technology in exchange for promising to grantback patented improvements to other pool members. 8 0 The difference, according to Cambia, is that its protected commons would be "accessible to all."'" This would indeed be true if Cambia charged no royalty. However, Cambia actually proposes to charge commons members an annual "subscription fee" ranging from $10,000 to [Vol. 76:2
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$150,000.82 Even for biotechnology companies, this figure is substantial. 83 As in a conventional commercial patent pool, profit-maximizing businesses would not join the commons unless they expected membership to generate sufficient earnings to cover their royalty fees. Since these earnings would be inversely proportional to the number of companies already using the technology, we expect the commons to stop growing at roughly the same size that commercial patent pools do. 4 While the arrangement might still benefit society, 85 it would not be "accessible to all" in any meaningful sense. Moreover, protected commons membership would be further restricted by Cambia's internal procedures, which provide that new members must be "approved by a project curator" according to "a member approval process., 86 Project curators drawn from industry would have an obvious incentive to prevent competitors from joining the commons.
87
For now, it is hard to say more than this. Cambia's draft licenses and Bioforge's website have laid the groundwork for an elaborate experiment. Licensees may accept openness, they may insist on patent pool-type membership 82 Cambia, License for Plant Enabling Technology Version 1.3.1, supra note 74, at 11 6.1, 6.2 & Annex D. Cambia has also said that it hopes companies will agree to contribute in-kind research and development resources to the commons. Cambia, A Hypothetical Scenario: A Future Researcher Uses BioForge, http://www.bioforge.net/forge/entry.jspa?extemallD=33 (last visited July 16, 2007) ("If the project is particularly exciting, or a case can be made for its importance, one or more of the many public and private institutional investors and funders -foundations, governments, businesses -who also access the BioForge ... can establish a revenue base from which to draw to overcome resource limitations on key players."). Such contributions would constitute royalties in their own right. 83 By way of comparison, companies paid a $10,000 annual royalty during the 1980s for access to the very basic Cohen-Boyer methods for combining and transplanting genes. While licensors claimed that they had deliberately set royalties low to promote access, the fee was nevertheless a "genuine burden for many small biotech startups." ARTHUR KORNBERG, THE GOLDEN HELIX: 
IV. DESIGN PRINCIPLES
The existing biology collaborations either fail to fit our definition of open source or are too preliminary to evaluate. While this observation is discouraging, it actually says very little about whether open source drug discovery is possible. The conventional arguments against open source drug discovery are (a) that open source has no way to recover its costs from patients, and (b) that patent incentives will drive out open source voluntarism wherever they meet. However, these claims are hardly airtight. First, patents and patient revenues are more or less irrelevant to a large class of pharmaceutical research and development problems. These include diseases of the developing world,' 0 ' bioweapons, r°2 and so-called orphan diseases.
1 0 3 Here, progress can only be made if government and non-profit programs -cover researchers' costs. These initiatives could well include a role for open source. Second, commercial drug discovery is not monolithic. Instead, it consists of roughly a dozen innovation steps, each of which requires its own specialized personnel, equipment, and skill sets. ' In the software world, companies often compete at one level (e.g., applications programs) while supporting open source cooperation at another (e.g., operating 
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UMKC LA W REVIEW systems).°5 Therapeutics companies may similarly find it in their dollars-andcents interest to support open source drug discovery at various points along the drug discovery pipeline.
6
The challenge now is to find places in the drug discovery pipeline where recognizably open source methods could actually flourish. The fact that such niches have not been colonized already suggests that they are subtle. For this reason, simple analogies to computing will not provide much guidance. This article argues that a more systematic approach is needed. There is now a large and insightful literature explaining when open source software production works and -just as importantly -when it offers more social benefits than alternative methods like patents. 0 7 One way to exploit these insights is to scrutinize the long and complex drug discovery process for niche activities where open source collaborations would be simultaneously feasible and useful. This article begins the process by identifying and discussing five specific examples.
The starting point for this analysis is to ask where open source incentives are likely to be effective. Table 1 describes typical incentives that are known to drive open source collaborations in software production. A few of these (e.g., production for the inventor's own use or production to sell a related good or service) seem to lack clear analogs in drug discovery. However, many other incentives do apply. For example, it is not hard to imagine that biologists would join collaborations to learn new skills (education), demonstrate those skills to others (signaling), or donate their services from a sense of altruism.' 0 8 For drugs with commercial potential, employers could also pay employees to "volunteer" for cold-blooded business reasons. For example, a firm could decide that open source collaborations were a good way to share costs with companies that do not produce competing products.
Or it could decide that an open product would make its own proprietary inventions more valuable." 0 Sections V and VI identify five different locations along the drug discovery pipeline where the foregoing incentives could be strong enough to drive an open source collaboration.
Of course, arguing that an open source collaboration is possible is not the end of the story. We should also ask whether a successful open source collaboration would be good for society. In general, open source methods have both strengths and weaknesses compared to patents. Consumers benefit chiefly by (a) low prices, which facilitate the widest possible consumption, and (b) increased transparency, which makes it easier to judge the quality of both existing and proposed products."' Similar benefits are likely to be important at various points along the drug discovery pipeline. Open source software also has [Vol. 76:2
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disadvantages, most notably in its tendency to decouple product creation from the price signal and, hence, consumers' needs. Ironically, this is not always a disadvantage for drug discovery. Indeed, efforts by western governments and foundations to find cures for neglected diseases normally assume that marketdriven research and development signals are hopelessly inadequate and should be overridden. Section VII argues that open source collaborations would be welfare improving for each of the five niches described below.
Finally, open source methods often shift research and development costs from users onto innovators. This raises potential fairness issues. These issues probably do not matter much for neglected diseases, where it is probably acceptable to shift research and development costs from developing world patients (who cannot pay in any case) to volunteer researchers. The question of fairness is not as clear for rich nation diseases. However, in this case volunteers often receive corporate support. These costs will almost always be passed back to patients through the patent system.
V. NEXT STEPS
Here, we describe three open source drug discovery collaborations that are either currently being organized or could be organized within the next few years. Success would potentially lay the foundation for some of the more ambitious projects described in Section VI.
In Silico Drug Discovery. During the 1980s, biologists began using computers and large databases to do biology research "in silico." ll2 The basic idea was to identify proteins encoded by the genome that cause disease ("drug targets") by noticing subtle patterns in their sequence and/or structure, and then design novel molecules ("drug candidates") to turn off the proteins' functions.13 The main challenge for such projects -motivating large numbers of skilled workers to find and patch obscure flaws -is strongly reminiscent of Linus Torvalds' dictum that "given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow." ' (last visited July 16, 2007) . Admittedly, readers should take this observation with a large grain of salt. The genomic "alphabet" uses four characters and therefore contains more information than the binary language of software. More importantly, users trying to decipher the genome have no source code to consult.
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HeinOnline --76 UMKC L. Rev. 421 [2007] [2008] UMKC LA W REVIEW reasonable to think that methods which work in computing might also work for drug discovery. '" 6 Since 2004, I have worked with Professors Arti Rai and Andrej Sali" 17 to establish a Tropical Disease Initiative ("TDI")"1 8 where volunteers could comb on-line databases and run sophisticated computational chemistry simulations to develop new drug ideas. Just as most open source software collaborations start with a preexisting (if limited and buggy) code base, TDI will start with a kernel of possible targets supplied by a core group of researchers. Volunteers will then be organized around three separate tasks. First, they will search electronic databases for additional lines of evidence that the target actually does or does not control disease.19 The resulting information will be recorded separately for each target in an on-line document ("gene card") that members can continually update. Second, members will use sophisticated computational chemistry software to predict new chemical compounds ("drug leads") that (a) bind to proposed targets, and (b) possess certain characteristics needed to make a working drug. Compounds predicted by more than one simulation are likely to be especially promising. Finally, TDI members will reach a collective judgment identifying the most promising drug leads for further funding.
Like all open source drug discovery collaborations, TDI is an experiment. In scientific terms, skeptics point to the fact that commercial programs have found very few drugs using computers. 120 However, it is reasonable to think that TDI can do better, chiefly because developing world diseases have been studied far less than rich nation diseases in which all the easy drugs have been known for decades. In social terms, TDI skeptics ask whether the initiative can attract volunteers. TDI argues that there are many reasons for members to volunteer including ideology, education (i.e., the chance to learn computational biology), and signaling (i.e., the chance to advertise skills to potential employers). These incentives are similar to the ones that drive many open source software 116 See generally Stephen M. Maurer, Richard B. Firestone & Charles R. Scriver, Science's Neglected Legacy, 405 NATURE 117 (2000) . The fifty year-old tradition of large physics databases provides further grounds for thinking that in silico biology can be organized along open source lines. Because physics variables are related to each other through "conservation laws," knowing, say, three variables often lets researchers calculate the fourth. Editors of large physics databases routinely exploit this fact to predict values for variables that have never been measured. Using biology databases to predict drugs would be a similar, if decidedly more focused and goal-oriented activity. There is also a second similarity. While big physics databases are usually built around small paid staffs, most of the information is collected and compiled by volunteer editors. At least in physics, incentives like curiosity and reputation seem to be quite powerful. 
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collaborations 2 ' and should be particularly attractive to academics and graduate students. TDI would also allow students and scientists in the developing world to trade their passion and detailed local knowledge for the chance to work with and learn from leading rich nation research groups. Such interactions may never occur outside TDI's online world.
Chemistry. Despite years of effort, biologists' ability to predict successful drug candidates in silico remains limited. For this reason, it is important to supplement computerized research with physical experiments. The difference, of course, is that physical experiments are expensive. This means that open source collaborations must simulate a world in which reagents -like computer timecost nothing. To some extent, this world already exists since academic labs seldom bother to meter the costs of small-scale experiments. Furthermore, academic grantees can sometimes scrounge chemicals from other grants.
22
However, one suspects that funding agencies would have only limited tolerance for such behavior. The challenge is to find useful research and development projects that can be done within these constraints. Professor Matthew Todd believes that one such problem involves finding a better way to synthesize praziquantel, today's preferred drug for treating schistosomiasis1 23 Current methods indiscriminately make two mirror-image versions of the molecule, only one of which is biologically useful. Producing a pure version of the active ingredient would make it easier to administer the drug to children and deliver larger doses to adults.
1 24 "There are two ways in which organic chemists can help. One is to design synthetic routes or share experience on those being discussed. The other is to attempt one or two steps and share results, so that an optimized route may be arrived at."' 125 Significantly, only the second step requires physical resources. The first is a matter of cleverness and imagination.
Stem Cell Lines. In the software world, the price that an operating system commands often has very little to do with its inherent quality or cleverness. Instead, consumers may purchase it because other people already own it or have written applications for it or for other basically historical reasons. Because of these network effects, 126 even an indifferent product can end up commanding high prices. This situation is particularly frustrating for free-lance programmers who customize software for individual customers since it means splitting their wages with a monopolist. During the 1990s, many of these professionals famously created LINUX as an alternative to Windows. 
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, 127
For biologists, the closest analog to an operating system is a cell line. In the case of stem cells, therapeutics companies are already trying to coax individual cell lines to make heart muscle and other replacement tissues for the human body. In theory, each company could use its own lines. That, however, would mean forfeiting the chance to learn from past experiments. In practice, biologists prefer to adopt lines that have been used before (offer "more experience") even if they are not otherwise known to be "better.'
28
As with Windows, this preference suggests a tipping dynamic in which initially popular lines become steadily more popular over time. Evidence for this phenomenon can be found in stem cell requests processed by The National Stem Cell Bank. One-third of all requests specify just one of the thirteen available lines and the top three lines account for almost two-thirds (sixty-two percent) of all requests.129
It is worth asking what these dynamics would mean to a therapeutics company trying to develop stem cell-based treatments. In order to invent products, the company would already need a patent license from the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation ("WARF"). But what if tipping creates a second monopolist in cell lines? Some observers have suggested that challengers may be able to invent around 30 or invalidate1 3 ' WARF's patents. Therapeutics companies will gain nothing from this, however, if tipping effects create a cell line monopolist in the meantime. The situation will be even worse if WARF's patents are upheld. There is an old result in economics that if two monopolists own two (or more) resources needed to make a product the total price will be higher than if a single monopolist owned the inputs. 132 These results do not guarantee that open source sharing will emerge, but they do make it more likely.
VI. DISTANT, AMBITIOUS GOALS
So far, we have discussed pre-clinical projects. However, seventy-five percent of the cost of new drugs takes place after clinical trials begin., 3 For open source to be truly transformative, it must colonize this space. Using open source to organize clinical trials would be far more ambitious than the ideas discussed in Section V and could easily take a decade or more to achieve. The question remains whether such collaborations make sense. We start with the simplest case in which an open source collaboration would conduct post-approval ("Phase IV") tests to expand FDA approval for an existing drug. We then ask whether drug companies have any reason to support open source participation at the more expensive Phase I, II and III stages of testing.
Phase IV Trials. At first blush, the idea of downstream open source seems counterintuitive. Who will pay for the drugs and physicians? However, as Professors DeMonaco, Ali, and Von Hippel have pointed out, there is at least one context in which the drugs and physicians are already paid for.' 37 Physicians often discover that drugs have so-called "off label" uses not previously considered by the FDA. At this point, manufacturers typically conduct additional 
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UMKC LA W REVIEW tests ("Phase IV trials") to persuade the FDA to amend and expand its original approval. Given that the healthcare system already pays for treating physicians and drugs, a Phase IV open source project need only persuade members to take, report, and analyze data. Here, motives like advancing medicine, reputation, and showing off skills to potential employers may be sufficient. Professors. DeMonaco, Ali, and Von Hippel argue that the current system for finding "off label" uses suffers from "major inefficiencies" and that a model similar to "open source software" could improve matters. 38 Naively, an open source Phase IV collaboration would put its discoveries in the public domain. In this case, open source would play the same role that it does in software: reducing product prices so that more consumers can afford them. Alternatively, aggressive drug companies might think of a way to patent the new uses. Thinking of such tactics, however, is not the same as using them. Even if drug companies never obtained a patent, they would still benefit from increased sales. Waiving patent claims to these new uses might be an acceptable trade if it persuaded more open source volunteers to join the project.
Phase I -III Trials. A successful Phase IV open source collaboration would inevitably encourage volunteers to organize pre-clinical trials as well. Since the healthcare system does not normally pay for Phase I -III trials, Big Pharma would have to support these projects. Interestingly, it might have a business reason to do so. In the late 1990s, drug companies spent $802 million for each product that they delivered to market.' 3 -A large fraction of these costs was devoted not so much to discovering drugs as persuading the FDA that Big Pharma's claims were correct. Unfortunately, regulators are right to be skeptical. Over the years, there have been repeated scandals in which researchers and clinicians have falsified data to keep lucrative research and development contracts alive.14 0 In principle, the FDA could relax its paperwork requirements -and drug companies could reduce their testing costs -if the process was more trustworthy.
Section V argued that open source is a natural vehicle for achieving transparency and/or insulating data from commercial bias. Instead of conducting their own trials, drug companies could simply make new compounds available at prices comparable to treatments already on the market. Commentators sometimes forget that open source drug discovery is not an end in itself.' 44 Instead, it is only worth doing if it benefits society. In practice, these benefits tend to be different for each of the projects described above.
Neglected disease collaborations (e.g., TDI) would offer three types of benefits. First, volunteers matter. By almost any standard, research and development for neglected diseases remains badly underfunded. Open source lets volunteers pitch in by aggregating small "granular" contributions of labor and expertise into a significant research and development effort.
14 ' These contributions are especially useful because they happen to focus on the very earliest stages of the drug discovery pipeline that are most in danger of running dry.' 46 (1972) .
UMKC LA W REVIEW prices for therapeutics companies. At least in part, these savings would be passed on to consumers. This would allow more patients to purchase the drug and give society more bang for its research and development investment. On the other hand, the main advantage of open source clinical trials would be their transparency. These benefits could be extremely important if they allowed the FDA to reduce its current monitoring and paperwork costs.
Finally, all of the foregoing projects would organize science in ways that look very different from today's world of commercial secrecy and small competing academic laboratories. This would have two distinct benefits. First, volunteers would have an opportunity to pool information that might otherwise be kept secret or proprietary. In theory, companies have nothing to lose by sharing their databases with outside groups studying neglected diseases because developing world markets have little or no commercial value. However, this will only be true as long as the shared data does not leak back into the race to develop new drugs for rich nation diseases. These concerns will be much reduced if the company's employees are also open source volunteers. In this case, only group members who were already insiders would ever see the full database, although any answers they came up with would obviously have to be made public.1 Second, small academic laboratories are perennially short of manpower. This forces them to replace human judgment with computation wherever possible. But human judgment is valuable. Indeed, commercial bioinformatics companies often hire large teams to sift through data by hand. A successful open source collaboration would extend this "many eyeballs" strategy to basic research.
VIII. ARE OPEN SOURCE DRUG DISCOVERY LICENSES LEGAL?
Open source software's most famous legal innovation is surely the viral license that requires improvers to offer any modified code on the same open terms as the original software. Traditionally, these licenses have been based on copyright.
Perhaps surprisingly, none has ever been tested in court. Nevertheless, most commentators think that such viral restraints are valid. The situation becomes much more complicated, however, when one tries to build viral terms into a patent license. This section asks whether open source drug discovery needs viral licenses and, if so, whether such licenses are enforceable. Nothing in the Patent Act would suggest that a patent could be invalidated because some of the underlying data was derived from a database in violation of the database's terms of use. Thus, it is unlikely that the HapMap license provides any meaningful remedy once a patent has been filed. Similarly, once data has been published in violation of the license terms, the horse will have left the barn. Since the HapMap project is a nonprofit venture, any damages from such a contractual breach are likely to be highly speculative.
Are Viral Licenses
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OPEN SOURCE DRUG DISCOVERY much as transfer them to the licensor. Since no incentives are destroyed, we expect all profitable ideas to be implemented sooner or later. This same logic would apply to the de facto patent pool established by Cambia's protected commons scheme. As long as the pool's size was limited, existing members could be sure of recapturing all profits from any improvement. Knowing this, we would expect them to disclose profitable ideas and share development costs as necessary. As in the commercial case, Cambia's grantback clause would only redistribute patent incentives, not destroy them. The answer would be very different, though, if Cambia designed its commons so that membership really was "accessible to all.' 62 In this case, the defining feature of patents -the power to exclude -would no longer apply. Instead of transferring patent incentives, Cambia's grantback clause would make them disappear entirely.
This result might be acceptable if we knew that new ideas would continue to be developed anyway under open source incentives. However, there is no reason to expect this: In general, we expect patent incentives to support at least some R&D projects that open source does not. 163 For this reason, a Cambia-style viral contract potentially poses much greater dangers than the grantback clauses found in conventional patent pool cases like Transparent-Wrap. We should not lightly overrule Congress's policy judgment that patent incentives are an important research and development incentive. At the same time, it makes sense to develop ideas using open source methods as much as possible, since this means fewer patent monopolies. It therefore seems reasonable to let parties write viral licenses for limited periods of time so that patent incentives can be brought back into play if open source methods fail. The HapMap Collaboration's decision to waive license restrictions that had initially prevented users from seeking patents is very much in this spirit. Future open source drug discovery collaborations would be well-advised to design viral terms that fade away over time.
IX. CONCLUSION
In the late 1990s, the idea of open source drug discovery seemed so inevitable that there was no particular need to ask how it would work. "Wait and see" seemed like a sufficient response. Today, commentators have fallen into the opposite fallacy of dismissing the concept in a few.words. We have avoided both extremes, arguing that open source drug discovery is neither inevitable nor impossible, but merely difficult. In the process, we have identified five scenarios where open source ought to work and would be a distinct improvement compared to conventional patent incentives.
Nobody would claim that this list is exhaustive, but it does show that open source drug discovery is worth thinking about. Additional examples are limited mostly by our imagination.
162 This could be done, for example, by eliminating the "subscription fee," in-kind contributions, and "member approval process." See supra text accompanying notes 81-89. 163 Maurer & Scotchmer, Open Source Software, supra note 105, at 288-90.
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UMKC LA W REVIEW Imagination, of course, is what commentators are supposed to supply. Over the past decade legal scholars, economists, and other social scientists have learned a great deal about the incentives that drive ordinary open source software. For this reason, the idea of open source drug discovery comes as a sort of final exam -similar to software in many respects but also sufficiently different for naive analogies to be misleading. Success will require a much deeper and more detailed understanding than anyone would have imagined ten years ago.
The stakes are high. Open source is often a plausible strategy for reducing drug development costs and making new medicines affordable; it offers increased transparency for funding agencies trying to decide which early stage drug candidates to invest in; it may allow regulators to reduce the reporting requirements that help make late-stage drug discovery expensive; and its ability to mobilize volunteers offers a key advantage to cash-strapped neglected disease programs. Perhaps more importantly, open source is the first fundamentally new innovation mechanism since patents and copyright appeared four centuries ago. 
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